This paper argues that in revising the Takeover Bid Directive, EU policymakers should adopt a neutral approach toward takeovers, i.e. enact rules that neither hamper nor promote them. The rationale behind this approach is that takeovers can be both value-creating and value-decreasing and there is no way to tell ex ante whether they are of the former or the latter kind. Unfortunately, takeover rules cannot be crafted so as to hinder all the bad takeovers while at the same time promoting the good ones. Further, contestability of control is not cost-free, because it has a negative impact on managers' and block-holders' incentives to make firm-specific investments of human capital, which in turn affects firm value. It is thus argued that individual companies should be able to decide how contestable their control should be. After showing that the current EC legal framework for takeovers overall hinders takeover activity in the EU, the paper identifies three rationales for a takeoverneutral intervention of the EC in the area of takeover regulation (pre-emption of "takeoverhostile," protectionist national regulations, opt-out rules protecting shareholders vis-à-vis managers' and dominant shareholders' opportunism in takeover contexts, and menu rules helping individual companies define their degree of control contestability) and provides examples of rules that may respond to such rationales. 
Introduction
Both before and after the adoption of the Takeover Bid Directive 1 (TBD), the policy debate on European Takeover law has almost exclusively focused on how as section 3 and 4 show, many EU rules hinder takeover activity rather than promoting it. That is because in general policymakers have a tendency to enact rules that protect incumbent managers or controlling shareholders from the market for corporate control.
Such a pro-incumbent approach has so much characterized national takeover laws in the past decades that the starting point for EU intervention in the area was one displaying a number of national anti-takeover measures. It was only natural for the EU to include them in the TBD in its attempt to provide a single EU-wide legal framework for takeovers. By doing so, however, it took national anti-takeover provisions under its 3 wings, thereby extending them to all EU states and petrifying them at least until the review of the TBD. 4 When the time for the review of the TBD comes in 2011, 5 the European Commission will predictably try to push for more mandatory rules, such as the ones it failed to impose in 2004, to tilt the current legal framework in the direction of more contestability (I call this possible outcome an "enhanced TBD regime"). It is highly unlikely that a similar attempt will be more successful in 2011 than in the first half of the 2000s: 6 national governments' protectionist instincts have, if anything, strengthened since then.
This contribution outlines an alternative regulatory approach to takeovers with specific reference to the EU framework. It argues that EU law should adopt a consciously neutral approach to takeovers, i.e. it should aim neither to make European companies easier to take over nor hinder the functioning of the market for corporate control by making takeovers more costly and therefore more rare. Section 2 articulates this claim based on the hardly contestable proposition that takeovers as such are neither good (value-creating) nor bad (value-destroying): there are good and bad takeovers, but takeover rules cannot be crafted so as to hinder all the bad ones while at the same time promoting all the good ones. After showing that EU rules are overall "takeover-hostile"
in Sections 3 and 4, Section 5 illustrates how a takeover-neutral EU legal framework would look like. Section 6 concludes. 4
The economic rationale of a neutral approach
Takeovers perform two functions: they discipline managers and reallocate control. Let us first consider takeovers as a discipline device. Their positive effects on managerial agency costs are impossible to quantify, if only because it is the mere possibility of a takeover that aligns managers' interests to those of shareholders. While these benefits may be substantial, 7 the available empirical evidence shows that hostile takeovers that do occur are not targeted at underperforming companies. 8 Further, this disciplinary device also has a negative side. The threat of hostile takeovers does not allow managers to protect their firm-specific investments, which are potentially valuable also for shareholders (and other stakeholders). If managers face the risk of being ousted following a hostile takeover, they will tend to make less human capital investments of this kind.
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The second function of takeovers (control reallocation) is equally important, but unfortunately this market is far from perfect. Shareholders' collective action problems on the one hand and the presence of private benefits of control on the other can lead both to the failure of value-increasing takeovers and to the success of value-decreasing ones.
First, shareholders' collective action problems can distort the outcome of takeovers because of the free riding problem. A prospective acquirer will launch a tender offer if the gains exceed the costs. In principle, this is done by identifying 7 See most recently Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken, 118-122 (2008 undervalued companies, bidding for all of their shares at a price (slightly) above the current one, and, after the purchase, profiting from bringing stock returns to full potential. 10 Unfortunately, due to target shareholders' collective action problems, this strategy is not as easy to implement as it looks. Anticipating the higher stock returns, an individually rational shareholder prefers not to tender hoping that the other shareholders will, so as to free ride on the takeover gains. 11 Dispersed shareholders, being unable to coordinate, will all think the same, leading to the takeover failure. That is, unless, of course, the bidder offers them the entire expected post-takeover value increase. But that would deprive the bidder of any profit, which means that she will not launch the bid to begin with.
Free riding is less severe in the real world than theory predicts, but the substantial gains accruing to target shareholders are evidence of its existence. 12 One prominent reason why the free riding problem is not as extreme as theory predicts is that target shareholders face a second collective action problem, i.e. pressure to tender.
6 structure effectively solves the free riding problem, it prompts dispersed target shareholders to accept even bids in which the expected post-takeover value is lower than the pre-acquisition value. In other words, it makes even value-decreasing bids possible.
14 All major jurisdictions, including EU ones and the EU itself, provide for rules that aim to solve, or at least alleviate, the pressure to tender problem. In doing so, however, they bring back the free riding problem to the foreground and therefore negatively affect value-increasing bids. They also make all tender offers more costly, and therefore less profitable for bidders. At the margin, thus, they have a negative impact on value-increasing takeover bid activity.
An alternative to laws aimed to protect target shareholders against pressure to tender is to let individual companies themselves devise contractual solutions to it, such as charter provisions granting a majority of the shareholders or the corporate board a veto over the takeover. A private ordering solution to the free riding and pressure to tender problems has the great advantage of allowing for adaption of the response to the specific characters of each individual company. Whether a company's control should be more or less contestable is in fact a function of a number of variables, such as its ownership structure, the levels and kind of private benefits available to those in control and the relative importance of managerial firm-specific human capital investments. A company's shareholders, whether at the IPO stage or mid-stream, are ultimately in the best position to strike the balance between all such variables. A one-size-fits-all solution devised by lawmakers will inevitably make some companies more open to the market 7 for corporate control, and some others more protected from its disciplining and/or reallocation effects, than it would be optimal.
The framework is different in the presence of a controlling shareholder, but again control transfers can be value-creating as well as value-decreasing and the conclusion to be reached is the same as before, i.e. private ordering is better than onesize-fits-all solutions. Here, changes in control are normally operated by voluntary exchanges of the controlling block. 15 The main problem is that the acquirer's gains can come from the extraction of higher pecuniary private benefits of control and/or from better management, synergies and so on. If the difference between the seller's private benefits of control and the acquirer's is negative and significant enough, the acquirer can profit from the transaction even if the overall value of the company under her control is lower than under the seller's. In other words, the acquirer's gains can be the minority shareholders' losses. A solution to this problem is the mandatory bid, which forces the acquirer to extend to minority shareholders the same terms of purchase offered to the seller, thereby ruling out inefficient takeovers. Unfortunately, the mandatory bid also reduces the number of successful value-increasing takeovers, because of the additional costs of paying the control premium to minority shareholders. To conclude, takeover regulation should be as neutral as possible, i.e. be designed in such a way as to neither hamper nor promote takeovers via (inevitably) onesize-fits-all solutions. This implies mainly deferring to private parties' choices, but there still is a role for the law to play, and especially for EU (or federal) law, as section 5
shows. Before describing how a takeover-neutral EU law would look like, let us see how distant current EU law is from this approach.
The current EU approach: (1) the few rules promoting takeovers
As we have seen in the previous section, the market for corporate control and hostile takeovers more specifically are considered to be highly effective in disciplining managers and are thus a powerful market-based tool to indirectly protect the interests of shareholders. Further, a market in which hostile takeovers can more easily succeed is also one in which cross-border acquisitions will be more frequent, and thus a more integrated one. Rules promoting takeovers are therefore justified both because they indirectly protect the interests of shareholders (Article 50 (2) an impact on takeovers. What counts is that the list is exhaustive with regard to rules explicitly or specifically conceived of as pro-takeovers. 18 To be sure, Article 3(1)(c) TBD spells out the principle that "the board of an offeree company must act in the interests of the company as a whole and must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid." It is doubtful, however, whether this principle has any operational value in the law in action for any company that is not subject to Articles 9 and 11. Similarly, the fact that the board neutrality and break-through rules are the "EU" default means these rules have hardly any operational impact, because member states can opt out. should not per se be regarded as abusive, it entails a higher legal risk, therefore discouraging buy-backs as a defensive measure.
The current EU approach: (2) the many rules hindering takeovers
We have seen that takeover bids can also harm shareholders' interests by exploiting the collective action problem of the target shareholders as against the bidder. h. Finally, and least importantly, even the rule requiring target companies to "make public a document setting out its opinion of the bid" has an albeit trivial negative impact on takeover activity, because it requires target companies to bear the direct and indirect costs of preparing and publishing the document. Of course, target companies would always try to communicate with shareholders in the event of a hostile takeover. But they might keep silent when the bid is friendly.
At least two other pieces of EU company law are to mention as "takeover- pertaining to the protection of employees. 43 While it may be argued that they also have a (very mildly) adverse impact on takeover activity, I have omitted them for the sake of brevity.
To summarise, the EU rules hampering takeovers are more numerous than those promoting them. Because their relative importance varies, it may be subject to debate whether the overall outcome is one rather hindering than promoting takeovers. But intuitively the current regime leans on the side of hampering them.
The building blocks of a neutral approach
I have argued that (EU) law should be neutral toward takeovers, i.e. set a framework of rules neither subsidising nor hampering takeover activity, while at the same time letting individual companies choose whether and how easily their control should be reallocated. 44 That does not imply that there should be no EU law on takeovers, however. In fact, while most of the TBD rules making takeovers riskier and costlier or promoting them should be scrapped, harmonising measures in this area are still justified on three grounds.
First, the EU's fundamental aim of promoting market integration makes it a good candidate to act as a countervailing force against member states' tendency to 16 devise rules that protect incumbents and therefore hinder takeover activity. 45 In other words, EU law should ideally rule out member states' ability to issue rules of that kind.
Second, there is a clear conflict of interest between managers or block-holders and (other) shareholders in defining a company's policies vis-à-vis takeovers, whether hostile or friendly, and in implementing it. Managers and block-holders will have the upper hand at both stages, if anything due to shareholders' collective action problems, and therefore push for a low degree of contestability or greater freedom to sell or consolidate control. It makes sense thus for a takeover-neutral policymaker to devise default rules that tilt on the side of more contestability (in management-controlled companies) and on the side of more shareholder protection (in companies with a controlling shareholder).
Third, because of the mandatory structure of many member states' company laws, both in general and with regard to takeovers specifically, a neutral approach to takeovers should aim to remove national company law barriers to contractual freedom in designing corporate policies on control contestability. Menu (opt-in) rules could be used for this purpose.
a. Limiting member states' freedom to enact or retain incumbent-friendly rules.
Well before the TBD, many member states had issued rules hampering takeover activity. The EU may have a role in shaping EU takeover policy by enacting preempting rules, i.e. rules that limit member states' freedom to tamper with takeovers.
Because of the political saliency of takeovers and of the varying preferences among 45 On such a tendency by lawmakers see e.g. national polities with regard to such transactions, it would be politically impracticable to do anything more than setting limits on member states' takeover-hostile intervention. In other words, it is recognized here that an outright ban on takeover-hostile national laws would never possibly pass.
Various EU pre-empting rules can be thought out. Here are some examples.
1. Because disclosure obligations for owners of major shareholdings discourage takeover activity by limiting the freedom of soon-to-be bidders to build toeholds in the target company, the EU should prevent member states from defining too low a threshold. It should also require member states to grant those who launch a takeover bid within, say, one month from the date when the threshold was crossed, an exemption from such obligations. Of course, EU legislation should allow individual companies freely to "opt down" to a lower initial threshold or "opt up" to a higher one. They should also let them opt out of the exemption for prospective bidders. Finally, because this is an area in which other policy considerations may drive national policymakers, EU legislation should allow Member States, first, to define minimum and maximum thresholds, below or above which individual companies may not opt down or up, and, second, to define a threshold (not lower than an EU-defined minimum threshold) above which even prospective bidders have to disclose their holdings.
2. EU legislation should not require bidders to publish an offer document.
Because it has always been a hallmark of takeover legislation, it is realistic to let member states retain this requirement. In that case, however, EU legislation should specify that national rules may not make its publication conditional upon prior authorization by the supervisory authority. default arrangements, one more restrictive and one less restrictive with respect to management, erring on the side of the more restrictive arrangement would carry with it a certain important advantage," 50 i.e. that "relatively little will be lost because both shareholders and managers will support a charter amendment opting out of this inefficient arrangement." 51 In contrast, as Bebchuk and Hamdani observe, "when opting out requires a charter amendment, if the nonrestrictive arrangement is chosen and then turns out to be inefficient, it might often persist despite its inefficiency," 52 because managers (and/or controlling shareholders) might gain in private benefits more than they lose qua shareholders.
In the presence of a trade-off between minority shareholder protection and promotion of takeovers, a neutral lawmaker should choose the default rules depending on whether investor protection or contestability is more relevant to counter the selfinterested behaviour of the controlling agent. When a dominant shareholder is in place, control entrenchment prevails anyway, whereas control transfers can be a form of shareholder expropriation. When managers are in control, that risk is less relevant than the adverse effects of entrenchment. Default rules should err on the side of minority shareholder protection in the former case, and on the side of contestability in the latter.
Although admittedly it would be difficult to design rules the application of which 49 See generally Ian Ayres, Optional Law, 142-65 (2005 
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depends on the company's control structure, there are five issues in takeover law that the EU would best legislate upon via default rules of this kind.
1. First, because the mandatory bid rule is a safeguard for minority shareholders in the event of opportunistic control transfers, it would make sense for the EU to craft it as a default rule. Individual companies should be free to opt out. Of course, this may imply that a higher than optimal number of companies would be subject to the mandatory bid rule than if there was no such default. But because the current regime in the EU provides for no opt-out, under the proposed rule European companies would be at least no less open to (friendly and hostile) takeovers than they are now, and some of them may become more so.
Action in concert is a necessary anti-evasion component of the mandatory bid
rule, but it also has a negative impact on useful forms of coordination among shareholders for monitoring and governance purposes and therefore may harm minority shareholders' overall position in a given company. Because the overall effect on minority shareholders is unclear, EU legislation may define "acting in concert" for the purposes of the mandatory bid rule strictly (i.e., so as not to hamper minority shareholder coordination on governance issues), but grant individual companies the freedom to provide for a different (whether stricter or broader) definition.
3. Tender offers launched by shareholders already controlling the company, normally with a view to delisting it (internal tender offers), are functionally equivalent to self-dealing transactions. 53 Because collective action problems may lead shareholders to accept low-ball bids that allow dominant shareholders to appropriate a disproportionate share of the company's value, EU default rules should provide for mechanisms to protect minority shareholders, such as a separate approval of the bid by a majority of the tendering shareholders. (Member States should, however, be free to treat such transactions as self-dealing ones, and accordingly apply their rules on self-dealing also to companies opting out of the EU default rules on internal tender offers.)
4. Article 9 of the TBD sets the board neutrality rule as an "EU" default, in the sense that member states are free not to implement it even as a default, provided they allow companies to opt into it, which no one does in member states that do opt out of board neutrality. 54 Given managers' aspiration to be protected from takeovers on the one hand, and shareholders' collective action problems in obtaining a charter amendment, on the other, it will be much easier for a company to opt-out of the default board neutrality rule than to opt into it if "no neutrality" was the default. Therefore, Article 9 should be converted into a real default rule for EU companies: member states would have to implement it as a default rule, and only individual companies would be free to opt out.
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5. Finally, the squeeze-out rule is an effective solution to the free riding problem in takeovers. EU legislation should require Member States to grant acquirers of corporate control, whether via a takeover bid or otherwise, the squeeze-out right in broad terms (such as following the acquisition of a simple majority of the shares), but companies should be free to "opt up" to a higher threshold or to opt out completely.
Again, managers (and de facto controlling shareholders) will have sufficient incentives to opt up or opt out if the default is pro-takeovers. To be sure, the squeeze-out right could also be (ab)used by dominant shareholders outside the takeover context. But
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given the default on internal tender offers, the possibility of a squeeze-out following an internal tender offer either is taken care of by the different default rule outlined above or is just a by-product of opting out of such a default rule.
c. Menu rules. The mandatory structure of company law in many European countries and at the EU level can hinder individual companies' ability to devise protections against takeovers. Such protections are not necessarily bad for shareholders.
They may serve the legitimate interests of incumbent managers or dominant shareholders, who might want stability of control as a quid pro quo for firm-specific human capital investments and/or for management monitoring. They may also aim to solve shareholders' collective action problems vis-à-vis takeover bids. And they may do both.
The EU should enact menu rules that allow individual companies to deviate from the legally defined (and in some countries legally mandated) degree of control contestability. For example, EU legislation should require member states to allow companies to grant the board of directors a veto power on takeover bids or any other equivalent mechanism (like a poison pill). 56 A provision like that would be extremely useful to permit companies that opted out of the board neutrality rule not to enter potentially harmful courses of action (such as leveraged cash-outs) to fend off hostile bids. In fact, a veto power or a poison pill work, as Jeffrey Gordon put it, like a neutron bomb: they "eliminate the hostile bidder but leave the target assets unscathed."
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Opening to this kind of defences would allow EU policymakers to leave Second 56 It should of course be possible to restrict the veto power (or use of the poison pill) to specific kinds of bids (such as coercive ones, or those with a premium lower than x percent above market price Under the policy approach proposed here, there might well be companies that opt for a higher degree of contestability than envisaged by current EU mandatory rules.
These companies would be more prone to (hostile) takeovers and, inevitably, bad takeover practices. It is, however, impossible to say whether such companies'
shareholders would be worse off: they should be held to have traded protection against bad takeover practices for a higher likelihood of takeovers, with the related gains and the ensuing greater market discipline for managers. As to other constituencies, such as creditors and employees, again in most companies they should gain in protections from controlling agents' tendency to raise barriers against takeovers.
Another criticism might be that, leaving so much scope for contractual freedom, and given controlling agents' incentives to adopt takeover-hostile charter provisions, the final outcome of such a model shift would be an even less takeover-friendly regime than is currently in place. Similarly, one may object that leaving companies free to decide whether and how minority shareholders should be protected in the event of a control transfer means granting majority shareholders such a freedom. Even conceding that these will fully internalize the costs of such a choice at the IPO stage, leaving those shareholders free to opt out of the mandatory bid rule and other takeover-related protections for minority shareholders midstream not only would redistribute value from minority to majority shareholders but may also be inefficient. 64 To address this criticism, however, one may qualify the proposals on mandatory bids and internal tender offers made above so as to require a qualified majority (or a majority of the minority) as a condition to the opt-out decision by individual companies that are already listed on the stock exchange at the time the proposed regime enters into force. There would be no need to extend this regime to companies going public thereafter, because at the IPO stage markets should be able to discount no-opt-out decisions that are not reinforced by a qualified majority or a majority of the minority clause for future opt-outs.
Further, one may counter that takeover law should not be moulded as an isolated piece of legislation, because it has obvious interactions with other corporate and securities law rules. If such rules are non-neutral themselves, then the overall picture of 26 laws more broadly affecting takeover activity might also be less neutral than envisaged.
In the previous sections I have shown that a review of EU takeover law would better also take other pieces of legislation that do affect takeover activity into account. But eventually, we cannot expect the EU to revise all company and securities law rules having an even more indirect effect on takeovers. So, indeed it is possible that the final outcome of a review according to the proposed approach will not be complete neutrality. But it would also be the case that, by scrapping most antitakeover laws at the EU level while at the same time introducing pre-emptive rules against protectionist national measures and pro-shareholders and pro-bidders defaults, the outcome will be more neutral than is currently the case.
A final criticism could be that giving so much contractual freedom to individual companies would raise uncertainty in the market as to each company's degree of control contestability, thus raising transaction costs for potential bidders. Again, the easy answer from a takeover-neutral perspective, even assuming that so much greater differentiation would ensue than is currently observed, is: so what? However, if this argument is thought to be significant, one could overcome it by retaining Article 10 TBD, which requires disclosure of individual companies' ownership structure and antitakeover devices.
Conclusion
I have argued that policymakers cannot assume that takeovers, whether hostile or friendly, are necessarily good or bad. Nor can they craft takeover rules that hinder all bad takeovers on the one hand, and promote exclusively good ones on the other. As a consequence, the (EU) regulation of takeovers should aspire to be neutral. I have 27 described how such a neutral, mainly optional EU framework could look like and addressed likely criticisms to the proposed framework. It is not obvious whether the regime resulting from the neutral approach would overall be more or less takeoverhostile than the current EU one, because (national and) contractual choices may tilt towards incumbents protection as opposed to contestability. But given the political hurdles to an enhanced TBD regime, it might be worth considering the neutral approach, or some of its building blocks, as a possible alternative.
